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Large datasets and novel statistical methods have given rise to a new wave of predictive
algorithms that increasingly guide all manner of public and private decisions.1 Many
(though not all) of these new-age predictive tools are generated by yet other algorithms
—that is, by automated processes that scour a dataset for patterns and thereby construct
a function for predicting, as best as the data permits, what will transpire in future cases.2
These predictive tools promise both vital information and refreshing objectivity: They
avoid many of the recurring mistakes made by human predictors, and, of course, they hold
Author: *Benjamin Eidelson is an Assistant Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. His prior work on the moral
foundations of discrimination law includes Discrimination and Disrespect (2015) and Respect, Individualism, and
Colorblindness, 129 YALE L.J. 1600 (2020). This article is based on a November 2020 keynote presentation for the
Workshop on Algorithmic Fairness at the University of Copenhagen. Thanks to Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen and Sune
Holm for that invitation; to Hannah Hilligoss, Adam Hosein, Martha Minow, Gerald Neuman, Cass Sunstein, and
the workshop participants for very helpful comments on earlier drafts; to Jared Lin for valuable research assistance;
and especially to Deborah Hellman for her characteristically generous engagement with this project, both through
her reply in this volume and through many fruitful conversations about the issues addressed here.
1 Nearly all predictions are made with “algorithms” in one sense of the word, but I will reserve the term for formal,
computational processes. Cf. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671 (2016).
2 See, e.g., Jon Kleinberg et al., Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 115 (2018)
(describing the relationship between training and screening algorithms).
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no positive or negative attitudes toward any of the people whose fates they are asked to
foretell.3
Yet a large and growing body of evidence shows that these predictive algorithms tend
to predict bad outcomes—recidivism, falling behind on a loan, and more—far more often
for members of socially disadvantaged groups than for others.4 And although the algo-
rithms’ predictions may be equally accurate for members of different groups, the ways
in which they err (when they do) differ: The algorithms tend more strongly toward mis-
taken pessimism when it comes to members of disadvantaged groups but more strongly
toward mistaken optimism when it comes to members of advantaged groups.5 These dis-
parities have fueled both technical and legal literatures about how different modifications
to the predictive algorithms (or to the upstream algorithms that produce them) might
achieve what many now term “algorithmic fairness.”6
This article takes up a more basic normative question that looms in the background of
those debates: Why are the disparities that I have just described morally troubling at all?
After all, if we know that access to resources and opportunities is stratified by race and
gender (as we do), then we should expect to see the effects of that inequality manifest in
different people’s likelihoods of realizing more and less favorable outcomes.7 Put differently,
if an algorithm were not more pessimistic about the prospects of members of disadvan-
taged groups, we would have to conclude either that the algorithm was distorted or that
3 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting Biases, 86 SOC. RSCH. 499, 500–04 (2019) (recounting evidence that
algorithms outperform judges in predicting flight risk, including because they do not suffer from “current offense
bias”); Kleinberg et al., supra note 2, at 154 (explaining how the use of algorithms can protect against “explicit and
implicit biases” regarding particular groups). As Kleinberg et al. argue, algorithmic decisionmaking is also potentially
transparent to investigation in ways that human decisionmaking is not. See id. at 116–18. But cf. Andrew D. Selbst &
Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2018) (discussing a
variety of “difficult questions about how to observe, access, audit, or understand . . . algorithms”).
4 See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article
/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing; Talia B. Gillis, The Input Fallacy, MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3571266.
5 See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Measuring Algorithmic Fairness, 106 VA. L. REV. 811, 815–16 (2019); Jon Kleinberg
et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores, 67 LIPIcs 43:1, 43:5–8 (2017), https://drops
.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2017/8156/pdf/LIPIcs-ITCS-2017-43.pdf.
6 See, e.g., Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1039–45 (2017); Cynthia Dwork et al.,
Fairness Through Awareness, CORNELL UNIV., arXiv:1104.3913v2 [cs.CC] (2011); Moritz Hardt et al., Equality of
Opportunity in Supervised Learning, CORNELL UNIV., arXiv:1610.02413v1 (2016); Hellman, supra note 5; Kleinberg,
supra note 5, at 43:5; Crystal Yang & Will Dobbie, Equal Protection Under Algorithms: A New Statistical and Legal
Framework, 119 MICH. L. REV. 291, 346–50 (2020).
7 As Glenn Loury put the same point: “Contemporary American society has inherited a racial hierarchy. . . . It can
be no surprise in such a society that the web of interconnections among persons that facilitate access to
opportunity and shape the outlooks of individuals would be raced, which is to say, that processes of human
development would be systematically conditioned by race. Thus, racially disparate outcomes at the end of the
twentieth century can be no surprise, either.” GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 106 (2002).
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the putative disadvantage was not really disadvantageous. And, importantly, much the
same goes for intergroup differences in the ratios of different kinds of errors: Any algo-
rithm that aims to get the right answer in as many cases as possible will produce just
such disparities. For, just as members of a disadvantaged group will necessarily tend to
have more bad outcomes, so too will they tend to have more of the characteristics that
are associated with a bad outcome even when one does not actually materialize.8
The point is that much of the putative unfairness that results from algorithmic
predictions—for which various interventions represent proposed correctives—probably
cannot just be chalked up to a biased view of reality.9 I hasten to add that some significant
portion of the observed disparities in predictions surely is due to forces that bias the data
against members of disadvantaged groups, making them appear riskier than they actually
are.10 But it should be uncontroversial that another significant portion of the disparities is
likely due to forces that bias the relevant facts against members of those same groups in a
manner that the data may then faithfully describe. Again, in an unjust society, it could
hardly be otherwise. And insofar as predictive algorithms yield disparate predictions for
the latter reason—that is, because they are making the most reliable predictions that the
relevant facts permit—how should we understand the moral concerns that the stark
disparities nonetheless elicit? Does the fact of those disparities tell in favor of discounting
the algorithms’ predictions and, in effect, refusing to treat alike cases that present the same
likelihood of a given outcome?11
8 See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 5, at 839–40 (“[I]f the information we have indicates that, collectively, one
group is more likely to recidivate than the other, more people in that group will be scored as high risk
(both correctly and incorrectly). . . . There are more false positives for blacks in the COMPAS data because
the data shows that blacks commit more crime and so the algorithm will predict more black crime and will do
so imperfectly.”).
9 Put differently, much of the putative unfairness cannot be understood as violating “the principle that any two
individuals who are similar with respect to a particular task should be classified similarly.” Dwork, supra note 6,
at 1.
10 For example, if a Black person is more likely to be arrested than a white person, conditional on committing the
same offense, and if a model uses data about past arrests to predict who will commit future offenses, then the
attributes that are disproportionately held by Black people will appear to be predictive of a future offense even if
they are not. See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2251–56 (2019). A related, but
distinct, issue concerns the choice of what outcome to treat as decisionally relevant in the first place. For instance,
a hospital that predicts patients’ expected future health costs, and triages its investments in their care on that basis,
will thereby prioritize the disproportionately white patients who are likely to use more healthcare over others who
are equally sick. See Ziad Obermeyer et al., Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of
Populations, 366 SCI. 447 (2019).
11 This discounting of the algorithms’ predictions could take various forms. See sources cited supra note 6. But, in
general, a rational decisionmaker who gives some weight to the demographic makeup of a class of people (such as
those detained, hired, or the like) “should not change the choice of estimator” to accommodate that preference,
but rather should simply “change how the estimated prediction function is used (such as setting a different [risk]
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In the first part of this article, I suggest that the answer to this question is “yes” and
sketch an explanation of why. The thrust and spirit of the argument will be familiar to
students of influential “anti-subordination” accounts of anti-discrimination law, although
I mean to draw out one thread of such accounts and disentangle it from others.12 Simply
stated, the explanation that I propose has two steps. First, the very fact that inequalities in
status, resources, and opportunities are discernibly patterned in terms of certain socially
salient identities brings about a great deal of human misery and social injustice. Second,
practices that accurately screen for various forms of “merit” predictably reproduce and
aggravate patterns of this kind.13
Those two premises together ground a powerful moral objection to the unbridled
use of the relevant selection practices. Importantly, however, it is an objection that
has little to do with the accuracy of any judgments about people. It would have force
even if an omniscient decisionmaker could somehow select the actual top candidates for
some position—those whose future job performance (or the like) would actually be best—
as long as the selected group would be disproportionately white and male. And so, accord-
ing to this line of thought, there is at least one serious problem with the use of algorithmic
predictions to make allocative decisions that is not really about algorithms or even about
predictions. It is just a general problem with allocating opportunities in ways that repro-
duce patterned inequality.
After sketching an argument along these lines, I introduce in Part II another moral
objection leveled against the same selection practices—namely, that individuals are some-
times wronged by otherwise-fair decisions because of the causal history that underlies
those individuals’ relevant characteristics. Over a series of important papers, Deborah
Hellman has developed an objection of that kind to explain both some traditional precepts
threshold for different groups).” Jon Kleinberg et al., Algorithmic Fairness, 108 AEA PAPERS & PROCS. 22, 22–23
(2018).
12 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Rational Discrimination, Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil
Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 847 (2003) (arguing that anti-discrimination law is best seen as “attacking practices
that entrench the systemic subordination of particular groups”); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107, 157 (1976) (suggesting that equal protection analysis should focus on whether
“the state law or practice aggravates (or perpetuates?) the subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged
group”); see also RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 27–28 (2d ed. 2012)
(arguing that if new laws “would not relieve the distress of the poorest group—or, worse, if they compound it—we
should reject them”).
13 Following T.M. Scanlon, I will use “merit” in an “institution-dependent” sense; so understood, it refers not to any
form of intrinsic value, but to the attributes that serve the justification for having some inequality in the first place.
See T.M. SCANLON, WHY DOES INEQUALITY MATTER? 40–46 (2018); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF
INTEGRATION 163 (2010) (positing that “‘merit’ is any characteristic of individuals whereby they advance an
institution’s proper mission through their performance in an institutional role”). Although I appreciate that some
will find all talk of merit problematic (at least without skeptical quotation marks), I think using the term helpfully
underscores that the argument advanced here does not depend on any such skepticism.
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of anti-discrimination law and the moral concerns raised by some decisions predicated on
algorithmic predictions.14 The core idea is that one wrongfully compounds a prior wrong
that a person has suffered by taking that wrong, or its effects, as a reason for doing something
to the victim that makes her still worse off. According to Hellman, legal and moral norms
about indirect discrimination,15 and related concerns about algorithmic prediction, take
aim at this kind of wrongful complicity in others’ earlier wrongdoing.
Laying these two accounts of anti-discrimination norms side-by-side facilitates the in-
tramural debate between them that I frame in Part III. The debate is intramural because
both concerns look beyond “meritocratic” worries about misjudging people and point in-
stead to the moral significance of facts about how merit is distributed in the first place. But
the debate is a debate because, at bottom, the normative visions are quite different: The ob-
jection from patterned inequality rests on the prospective effects, for the overall justice and
goodness of the society, of decisions about how present opportunities will be allocated,
whereas Hellman’s “compounding injustice” objection identifies a personal wrong done
to a disfavored individual and turns on the etiology of that individual’s present disadvantage.
I argue that the objection from patterned inequality is more plausible as a matter of moral
theory and better fits and justifies the ambitious conception of anti-discrimination norms
that I take to animate both views. And I suggest that this conclusion has important conse-
quences for how we think about wrongful discrimination, in the context of algorithmic
decisionmaking and beyond.
I. PATTERNED INEQUALITY, DISCRIMINATION, AND ALGORITHMS
A. The Problem of Patterned Inequality
All inequalities in resources, opportunities, and status raise questions of justice. But in
addition to the problems posed by inequality generally, there are special problems posed
when a society’s inequalities are patterned in terms of race, gender, and other socially sa-
lient axes of identity. That is not just because a stark pattern can be evidence of unfairness
14 See Deborah Hellman, Indirect Discrimination and the Duty to Avoid Compounding Injustice, in FOUNDATIONS OF
INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION LAW 105–121 (H. Collins & T. Khaitan eds., 2018) [hereinafter “Indirect Discrimination”];
Deborah Hellman, Sex, Causation, and Algorithms: How Equal Protection Prohibits Compounding Prior Injustice,
98 WASH. U. L. REV. 481 (2020) [hereinafter “Sex, Causation”]; Hellman, supra note 5, at 841–42; Deborah
Hellman, Big Data and Compounding Injustice, 18 J. MORAL PHIL. (forthcoming 2021).
15 Indirect discrimination norms come in weaker and stronger forms. In their weaker form, they require covered
actors to show that practices that have disproportionate effects on disadvantaged groups actually best serve the
actor’s ordinary goals (such as economic efficiency); apart from the burden of establishing such a justification, no
compromise of those goals is required for the sake of avoiding the disproportionate effects. In their stronger form,
indirect discrimination norms require that any asserted benefit in efficiency (or the like) be large enough to justify
the presumed harm of causing the disproportionate effects. See, e.g., Hugh Collins & Tarunabh Khaitan, Indirect
Discrimination Law: Controversies and Critical Questions, in FOUNDATIONS OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION LAW, supra
note 14, at 1, 16–17.
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in the processes that yielded the pattern (although it certainly can be that). It is also be-
cause the very existence of patterned inequalities gives rise to grave social ills and under-
mines human flourishing in ways that other inequalities do not.
Race in the United States is an obvious paradigm case. The fact that Black Americans
enjoy dramatically worse opportunities than white Americans, on average, has severely
negative consequences—consequences that would not follow from an equally unequal dis-
tribution that lacked the correlation with race. That is so for several reasons well explained
by others; I only summarize a few of the relevant dynamics here.
First, what I am calling patterned inequality (and only that kind of inequality) gives
rise to the problem of self-confirming stereotypes.16 Once a visible trait, meaningless in it-
self, is correlated with less visible attributes of interest, decisionmakers will tend rationally
to use the visible trait as a proxy for the traits of interest.17 And once they do that, indi-
viduals who hold the relevant visible trait will tend to adapt their own behavior in expec-
tation of that sorting process, often in ways that sustain or amplify the original correlation.
As Samuel Bagenstos explains, “[t]he result may be a vicious cycle of exclusion, in which
members of subordinated groups rationally respond to exclusion by failing to develop
their human capital, and employers, rationally believing that members of those groups
are less likely to have developed their human capital, discriminate even more.”18 Although
Bagenstos focuses on employment in particular, the same dynamic plays out across every
sphere of social life in which “[i]nformation-hungry human agents” draw inferences about
each other and modify their own aspirations, attitudes, and behavior in response to the
inferences they have learned to expect that others will draw about them.19
Second, this dynamic is compounded when those on the losing end of inequalities in
resources or status are socially isolated. Because residential patterns and social and eco-
nomic networks in the United States are themselves overwhelmingly patterned by race,
the fates of Black Americans are often linked together in ways that magnify the conse-
quences of bad outcomes suffered by each individual.20 The concentrated pockets of
disadvantage that result are far worse, in terms of their impact on individual well-being
16 See LOURY, supra note 7, at 26-35; ANDERSON, supra note 13, at 55–57; Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 842–43;
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION AND LABOR MARKETS 3, 26–27 (Orley
Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973).
17 Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 13, at 161 (“[R]ace is typically less costly to detect than the underlying relevant criteria.
This can make statistical discrimination on the basis of [race] instrumentally rational, even if the correlations are
not due to character races but to racialization.”).
18 Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 843.
19 LOURY, supra note 7, at 17; see id. at 23–33 (offering illustrations).
20 See id. at 103 (“Because access to developmental resources is mediated through race-segregated social networks, an
individual’s opportunities to acquire skills depend on present and past skill attainments by others in the same
racial group.”); Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 834; Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Private Discrimination: A
Prioritarian, Desert-Accommodating Account, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 835–36 (2006).
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and opportunity, than the sum of their individual parts.21 At the extreme, as Christopher
Lewis explains, “[w]here opportunities for regular, legal work are sparse, people have
stronger incentives to steal, rob, con, deceive, sell harmful and addictive drugs, [and] ex-
ploit others.”22 More generally, a social group whose members are disproportionately on
the losing side of inequalities will disproportionately lack the social and cultural capital
needed to access future opportunities, or to provide those opportunities for their children,
as well.23 Indeed, the very structures of the institutions affording those opportunities will
be warped so as to accommodate the needs of their usual occupants and not the needs of
others.24 And the worse things go for members of the group—the more starkly various
measures of well-being or achievement are racially patterned—the more strongly group
membership is apt to be associated with negative qualities by decisionmakers and treated
as a basis for further discrimination, fueling the same vicious cycle traced above.
Third, when the trait that correlates with a society’s inequalities has deep cultural
significance—and particularly when it carries a stigma in Erving Goffman’s sense—that
cultural significance will interact with the processes just described in ways that make them
still more destructive.25 For one thing, the stigma will color observers’ interpretations of
otherwise-ambiguous data in ways that fuel both epistemically rational and epistemically
irrational stereotyping.26 And for another, it will shape the larger society’s reaction to the
plight of those who find themselves on the losing side of inequality. Because Black Amer-
icans are stigmatized, for example, the disadvantages that many of them suffer are not met
with the empathy and attendant social mobilization that would be triggered if the racial
pattern were different.27 Instead, the outcomes are tacitly accepted as ordinary and unre-
markable or, indeed, treated as a basis for censure and punishment. The different societal
responses to the “crack epidemic” in Black communities and the “opioid epidemic” in
white ones offer a good example.28
21 For an extended argument along these lines, see ANDERSON, supra note 13.
22 Christopher Lewis, Inequality, Incentives, Criminality, and Blame, 22 LEGAL THEORY 153, 173–74 (2016).
23 ANDERSON, supra note 13, at 33–38; see also LOURY, supra note 7, at 99–104.
24 See SOPHIA MOREAU, FACES OF INEQUALITY 56–63 (2020).
25 See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963). This point is emphasized by
LOURY, supra note 7, at 55–108, and by Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 841–44, among others.
26 See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 154 (1997) (explaining how even well-meaning police
officers “will unintentionally exaggerate the criminality or potential for criminality of African-Americans” in
light of “age-old, derogatory images of the Negro as criminal”); ANDERSON, supra note 13, at 44–50, 55–57.
27 See LOURY, supra note 7, at 104–07; cf. David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 971–75 (1989).
28 Cf. LOURY, supra note 7, at 105–06.
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All of this could naturally be taken as a thumbnail sketch of group subordination or
oppression, and I have no quibble with those who would view it as such. I put the point in
terms of “patterned inequality” instead simply because this formulation allows us to pick
out a present state of affairs without any implicit reference to how it came about or to its
moral significance.29 “Subordination” and “oppression,” after all, are nominalizations of
verbs: They naturally refer to wrongful actions, or perhaps to states of affairs that are dis-
tinguished by being the effects of such actions. A pattern, by contrast, is not an action at all
and need not have any causal connection to one. Moreover, a focus on the pattern nicely
highlights that my argument here is individualistic in both its methodological and its nor-
mative commitments; a pattern is made up of individuals and has no existence apart from
them.30 In any event, my basic point is that when members of a socially salient group are
disproportionately among the worse off in a society, the very existence of that pattern in
the society’s inequality poses grave problems for a range of widely endorsed values. It
greatly undermines future equality of opportunity (measured at the level of individuals,
not groups); it makes it less likely that people will relate to one another as equals; and,
all issues of equality aside, it just means more overall misery and less overall flourishing.31
Finally, although I have focused here on race (and on Black–white inequality in par-
ticular), the story for some other socially salient identities would be only somewhat dif-
ferent. In the context of gender, for example, the lack of heritability and the comparative
lack of social isolation undoubtedly change the relevant dynamics. Still, the pattern in
which women tend to hold lower-status jobs than men is naturally analyzed in a funda-
mentally similar way. As with racial stratification, that pattern both causes and is caused
by a blend of rational and irrational stereotyping, predictable and perhaps individually
adaptive responses to stereotyping, and a background of social meanings and attitudes that
shape individual and collective responses to the continuing inequality that results.32 In
what follows, I will sometimes bracket these differences and refer to race and gender in
the same breath, or to race alone, for purposes of concision.
29 The language of “patterned inequality” is also employed by Iris Marion Young in Equality of Whom? Social
Groups and Judgments of Injustice, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 1 (2001). Young argues that warranted claims about “unjust
structural inequalities” require “finding patterned inequality and being able to tell a plausible story about how the
position in structures accounts for that inequality.” Id. at 17.
30 Cf. TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 129 (2015) (“[O]ur concern with relative group
disadvantage is based on a concern for individuals. Groups are salient to discrimination law because group
membership has a significant impact on the life-chances of a person.”).
31 Regarding the kind of substantive opportunity required to meet a complaint of inequality, see SCANLON, supra note
13, at 58–65; regarding the issue of status inequality, see id. at 26–39; and regarding the threat to well-being posed
by the “abiding, pervasive, and substantial relative disadvantage faced by members of [certain] groups,” see
KHAITAN, supra note 30, at 91–139.
32 See, e.g., Young, supra note 29, at 10–11.
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B. Anti-Discrimination Norms and Patterned Inequality
Anti-discrimination norms serve multiple functions, but among the most important is
that they undermine patterned inequality. When the law forbids employers to take ac-
count of race and gender in hiring, for example, it makes it less likely that the employers’
hiring will reproduce the existing, racialized and gendered pattern of advantage.33 Con-
cretely, it makes it more likely that candidates other than white men will apply for desir-
able positions, and more likely that employers will hire those who do, than would
otherwise have been the case.34 And to whatever extent the law’s intervention does that,
it serves to erode the intra-generational and intergenerational patterns that, through the
various mechanisms sketched above, limit many people’s flourishing and undermine
equality of status and opportunity.35
In many cases, to be sure, the same prohibitions also make the employer’s decisions
better track the candidates’ actual qualifications. The rules do that insofar as they prohibit
employers from bringing certain inaccurate beliefs or biased attitudes to bear.36 But it is a
mistake to think that anti-discrimination norms reduce patterned inequality solely because
they reduce bias in this way—or, similarly, that the reduction in patterned inequality is
just a happy by-product of the reduction in bias, rather than a central concern in its
own right. In fact, a great many discriminatory decisions could not be criticized as expres-
sions of the decisionmaker’s irrational bias—both because, in a society such as ours, race
and gender will often carry information about individual qualifications, and because inte-
gration along these dimensions sometimes comes with its own costs for employers.37 Un-
derstanding anti-discrimination norms as an intervention against patterned inequality
helps to explain why it is appropriate to prohibit discrimination in those cases (cases of
“rational” discrimination) just as in others.38 The harms of patterned inequality—and
33 I will not take up the possible extension of the argument here to other socially salient axes of identity (or
corresponding grounds of prohibited discrimination). To be clear, though, I do not presume that the
justification for every protected ground must be the same or that each must involve a concern about patterned
inequality. Likewise, the prohibited grounds of direct and indirect discrimination might justifiably differ. See
BENJAMIN EIDELSON, DISCRIMINATION AND DISRESPECT 40 (2015). For an instructive and more general discussion of
discrimination law’s “protectorate,” see KHAITAN, supra note 30, at 49–58.
34 In Owen Fiss’s early and frank formulation, “the antidiscrimination prohibition is a strategy for conferring benefits
on a racial class—blacks.” Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 313 (1971).
35 On the intragenerational aspect in particular, see JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 70
(2014).
36 See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 151 (2003) (suggesting that “the moral, legal,
and constitutional prohibitions on sex discrimination . . . are best understood as the mandated underuse of
gender-based generalizations to compensate for the likelihood of their exaggeration and the likelihood of their
overuse”).
37 See ANDERSON, supra note 13, at 161; Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 849–51.
38 Cf. Patrick Shin, Is There a Unitary Concept of Discrimination?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION
LAW 163, 175–76 (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013).
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hence the compelling reasons for seeking to reduce it—do not depend on whether any
particular person has or has not suffered any unfair bias in how she is rewarded for her
decision-relevant characteristics (i.e., loosely speaking, for her “merit”).39
Indeed, from this point of view, there is a basic unity to the traditional prohibition on
direct discrimination, the somewhat more controversial prohibition on indirect (or “dis-
parate impact”) discrimination, and the voluntary use of affirmative action policies. All
three can be understood partly as efforts to produce workforces, student bodies, and
the like that include more members of certain groups than selection processes uncon-
strained by any concern for the effect on patterned inequality would yield.40 By ensuring
that more members of particular groups hold these positions and can access their various
benefits, these interventions have the potential to disrupt the pattern-sensitive cultural and
economic processes that otherwise inflict grave harm.41 In the race context, for example,
they can facilitate interracial social networks, reduce the racial wealth gap, and challenge
through experience the stereotypic assumptions held by members of both dominant and
subordinated racial groups.42 Simply put, if the pattern itself is a problem, then a change in
the pattern is itself a solution.43
To be clear, I claim here only that this normative vision offers a persuasive account of
one of the important values served by anti-discrimination norms—not that it captures the
vision reflected in the modern case law of the U.S. Supreme Court. Some Justices (and
perhaps a majority) would balk at the notion of a concerted state effort to alter the racial
pattern in social inequalities, even if that effort were undertaken in service of values de-
fined without reference to race.44 They view anti-discrimination norms as efforts to align
39 Regarding my usage of “merit,” see supra note 13.
40 I offered an account of indirect discrimination law along these general lines in EIDELSON, supra note 33, at ch. 2.
As noted above, these laws generally impose a heightened standard of justification for practices that
disproportionately exclude members of particular groups. See supra note 15.
41 Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 843–44 (“Antidiscrimination law responds to the[] harms of social inequality by
promoting the integration of workplaces and other important areas of civic life. Such integration helps to remove
the stigmatic injury that results from exclusion in a number of ways. . . . ”).
42 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 13, at 149–50; RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION,
AND THE LAW 85–86, 106–08, 133–34 (2013). I do not claim that this is all that these prohibitions and policies serve
to do, or that the mechanisms are the same for the three different interventions. And I do not claim that
integration inevitably or perfectly accomplishes these objectives. For criticism along those lines, see Tommie
Shelby, Integration, Inequality, and Imperatives of Justice: A Review Essay, 42 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 253, 273–79
(2014).
43 Or, as Lily Hu nicely puts it: “[T]o riff on the words of Chief Justice John Roberts[,] . . . sometimes ‘the way to fix
inequalities in the category of race is to fix inequalities in the category of race.’” Lily Hu, Disparate Causes, Pt. II,
PHENOMENAL WORLD (Oct. 17, 2019), https://phenomenalworld.org/analysis/disparate-causes-pt-ii.
44 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730–46 (2007) (plurality opinion);
Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 553–55 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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allocative decisions with individual qualifications and nothing more. And even reasoning
in terms of racial groups—as one must in order to appreciate the harms and mechanisms
of racially patterned inequality—might strike these Justices as inconsistent with due re-
spect for the standing of each person as an individual. I think this vision is profoundly
mistaken, for reasons that I (and many others) have elsewhere explained, and for present
purposes I will simply set it aside.45
Before turning to what the outlook that I have sketched suggests about the use of pre-
dictive algorithms, let me highlight a few of its salient features. First, the concern I have
described is not centered on any personal wrong to an individual who is not chosen by
some selective process.46 As a matter of interpersonal morality, I do believe that some
common forms of discrimination involve serious moral wrongs of that kind; in past work,
I have focused in particular on the failure to show respect for the equality or autonomy of
those who are disfavored.47 But the particular normative concern that I have described
here—which is the one I take to provide much of the justification for anti-discrimination
laws—is very different. If we understand anti-discrimination norms as interventions to
reduce patterned inequality, then particular individuals are granted rights under those
norms for the simple reason that their fates are bound up with the larger social problem
under attack. In other words, it happens that getting them into more favorable positions
would be an improvement in the pattern.48 There are undoubtedly some other individuals
who are just as badly off and yet receive no similar aid, and there are surely others who
are morally wronged by the decisions made about them, in the same domains of decision-
making, and yet are given no legal recourse. Excluding those others from the protection
of anti-discrimination laws is justified, from this point of view, not because they are less de-
serving of help or have not suffered as serious a wrong, but simply because helping them
would not have the social benefit of undermining patterned inequality.
Second, the imperative to reduce patterned inequality is also not centrally concerned
with any history of injustice toward the group that finds itself on the losing side of the
45 For my explanation of why invocations of dignity and respect in support of “colorblindness” are misguided (and,
indeed, perverse), see Benjamin Eidelson, Respect, Individualism, and Colorblindness, 129 YALE L.J. 1600 (2020).
And for a sampling of other critiques of the conservative arguments for purging attention to race from the law, see
id. at 1605 n.16.
46 Cf. R. JAY WALLACE, THE MORAL NEXUS 163 (2019) (positing that “a [moral] duty is directed to another party only if
the considerations that go into establishing the duty center around that party” and that “it is personal interests of
the putative claimholder that will be prominent within such a person-involving justification”).
47 See EIDELSON, supra note 33, at chs. 3–5.
48 Cf. David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systematic Disadvantage: A Response to Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1915, 1939–40 (2005) (emphasizing how “the presence of black lawyers in the nation’s legal, business, and
government elites,” due in part to affirmative action policies, “confers benefits to the black community as a whole
—and to our nation and to the world”).
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pattern. It is true (of course) that the racialized pattern of inequality in the United States is
a consequence of centuries of race-based oppression. But the moral case for reducing ra-
cially patterned inequality does not depend on that backstory; it just depends on the pat-
tern of present facts that this history brought about. If the same facts—the same social
meanings, the same patterns of material advantage and disadvantage, and so on—had
somehow come about innocently, the case for intervening to reduce the patterned inequal-
ity, so as to thwart its ill effects, would not be any weaker. The case for reducing racially
patterned inequality that I have outlined thus could not be faulted for resorting to any
notion of “either a creditor or a debtor race.”49
Third, the justification for anti-discrimination norms that I have sketched here de-
pends on a premise that enforcing those norms will, in fact, reduce patterned inequality
and its baleful consequences.50 The justification could thus be defeated by showing that
this premise is wrong, either in general or in some particular case. Suppose, for example,
that a bank’s criteria for making mortgage loans—criteria based purely on conservative,
data-driven predictions about applicants’ ability to repay the loan—will result in making
loans to very few Black applicants. But suppose also that, if the criteria were relaxed so as
to produce more loans to less advantaged applicants, many of those newly added debtors
would go on to default and face foreclosure or bankruptcy—leaving them worse off than if
they had never obtained the loans. It is possible that this would amount to a net setback to
the effort to redress patterned inequality. And if so, the concern that I am highlighting
here would favor the original lending criteria over the proposed revision, even though
the original criteria yielded greater racial disparity in the bank’s lending decisions.51
C. Algorithmic Predictions and Patterned Inequality
If we understand patterned inequality as a serious problem for the kinds of reasons
that I have outlined—and as a problem to which anti-discrimination norms represent a
partial response—then it is easy to see why allocating goods and opportunities based on
algorithmic predictions is troubling in much the same way as other forms of discrimina-
tion. After all, the very point of the algorithms produced by machine-learning processes
is to identify patterns in the distribution of some form of merit and thereby to predict
49 Adarand Const. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring); cf. ANDERSON, supra note 13, at 153
(explaining that “[t]he integrative model [of affirmative action] takes a proactive stance toward [racial]
injustices: its aim is to dismantle the continuing causes of racial injustice”).
50 Cf. Shin, supra note 38, at 171 (noting a similar qualification).
51 The same would go, in principle, for other contexts in which concerns about “mismatch” that disserves the
beneficiaries of an intervention are raised. Cf. KENNEDY, supra note 42, at 145 (condemning “any initiative that
knowingly or negligently over-promotes beneficiaries, placing them in settings in which they are conspicuously
less prepared than nonpreferred peers, a situation rife with risks of demoralization and the creation or
reinforcement of racist stereotypes”).
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accurately individuals’ likely performance. And given a baseline of patterned inequality,
succeeding in that endeavor is a surefire way to sustain or compound the existing pat-
tern in the relevant domain.
Once again, it is important to appreciate that the concern here is not that the algo-
rithm might be “biased”—at least not in the most familiar sense of the word.52 To the
contrary, the concern that I have outlined would have significant force even if we could
somehow allocate opportunities based on the actual facts about who would perform best
on some relevant metric. Disadvantaged groups will usually be underrepresented in that
class—because they (and, in the context of intergenerational disadvantages, their parents)
will have had inferior opportunities, on average, in the past. Disadvantage, in other words,
is disadvantageous. And that means that allocating opportunities to those who would in
fact perform best will extend, and likely exacerbate, patterns that give rise to grave harm
and injustice.
Nonetheless, the imperfection of all actual predictions makes the problem significantly
worse in practice than it would be even in that idealized hypothetical, because members of
disadvantaged groups will usually be even more starkly underrepresented in the set of pre-
dictable best performers than in the set of actual ones. On average, that is, even the mem-
bers of disadvantaged groups who would be among the top n candidates ex post will not
look as promising as the others in that class ex ante. Their future high performance would
be judged more surprising, because they will tend to share less in common with the other
highest performers than the other highest performers share with each other, and they will
tend to share more in common with lower performers than the other highest performers
do. A process that picks the “best bets” will thus tend even more strongly toward picking
the comparatively privileged, thereby affording them (and those whose fates are linked to
theirs) still more opportunities, and at the same time denying yet more opportunities to
members of worse-off groups.
The bottom line is very simple: Basing allocative decisions on even the most sophis-
ticated predictive algorithms will tend to reproduce existing patterns in inequality and ce-
ment the matrix of stereotypes and social meanings that both cause and result from those
patterns. And that, I am suggesting, is a central reason why allocating goods and oppor-
tunities in this way is cause for moral concern—not because it necessarily treats any in-
dividual unfairly, but because it cuts directly against the urgent project of scrambling
existing patterns in societal inequalities. Indeed, from this point of view, the literature’s
52 Regarding the distinct concern that the data might overstate the riskiness of members of disadvantaged groups—
which does amount to a form of “bias” in the ordinary sense—see supra note 10 and accompanying text. (And
although I focus here on the concern that even a maximally accurate algorithm will contribute to patterned
inequality, I do not discount the possibility that biases of various kinds are importantly connected to patterned
inequality as well.)
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emphasis on so-called “algorithmic fairness” is unfortunate. For one benefit of extending
our thinking about discrimination to this new context should be an enhanced recognition
of how little the normative case for anti-discrimination norms ever depended on fairness—
in the intuitive sense of assessing individual merits without favor or prejudice—at all.53
II. COMPOUNDING INJUSTICE: HELLMAN’S ACCOUNT
In a series of illuminating papers, Deborah Hellman has developed an importantly differ-
ent explanation of the justifying rationale for some anti-discrimination norms and, like-
wise, for concerns about the use of predictive algorithms to allocate goods and
opportunities. According to Hellman, it is a pro tanto moral wrong to compound a prior
injustice. And an actor compounds a prior injustice, as Hellman understands it, when the
actor both “amplif[ies] the harm” that the injustice inflicted on someone and “take[s] the
fact of [that person’s] victimisation or its effects as her reason for acting.”54 I focus on
Hellman’s account here both because of its own influence and because I take it as the most
developed form of a more general idea about the moral logic of anti-discrimination
norms.55
Hellman’s lead examples of “compounding injustice” involve the use of someone’s
prior victimization as a basis for adverse predictions about future outcomes. In one hypo-
thetical case, a state decides to grant early release to prisoners with a low risk of recidivism.
One “highly predictive” indicator of recidivism, Hellman posits, is a history of suffering
child abuse.56 Nonetheless, she suggests, the state has “a strong reason” not to include this
variable in its predictive model: If the state denies someone early release because he suffered
53 See, e.g., SCANLON, supra note 13, at 42–43 (explicating a sense of “procedural fairness” according to which
“decisions [must] be made on grounds that are ‘rationally related’ to the justification for [the] positions,” and
giving nepotism and cronyism as examples); cf. LOURY, supra note 7, at 98 (noting “the tendency . . . to say that
individuals are being treated unfairly and not being given their due” when they are subjected to “reward bias,” i.e.,
not being rewarded equally for their qualifications). Of course, I do not deny that “fairness” can also be used in
many other, increasingly extended senses; the literature on “algorithmic fairness” amply demonstrates that it can
be. See, e.g., Arvind Narayanan, Translation Tutorial: 21 Fairness Definitions and Their Politics (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://youtu.be/jIXIuYdnyyk (surveying the many criteria that computer scientists have treated as possible
definitions of “fairness”); see also sources cited supra note 6.
54 Hellman, Indirect Discrimination, supra note 14, at 114.
55 For example, Sophia Moreau identifies Hellman’s approach as one of two possible pathways for those seeking to
explain the wrongness of indirect discrimination in a significant class of cases (those in which “‘recognition’-based
accounts” do not apply). Sophia Moreau, Equality and Discrimination, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 171, 180 (2016). The second of the two is along the lines that I have previously defended in the
context of indirect discrimination, see id.; see also supra note 40, and that I flesh out in more general terms in this
article.
56 Hellman, Indirect Discrimination, supra note 14, at 108–09.
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child abuse, it will be adding to the harms caused by that earlier wrong—and it will be doing
so not just incidentally, but by taking the fact of that wrong, or at least the fact of its an-
ticipated effects, as a reason for treating the victim worse than others. The same analysis
applies, Hellman suggests, to a life insurer’s decision whether to use a woman’s history of
suffering domestic abuse as a factor in setting her premiums.57 Although doing so might be
rational in the sense that past abuse predicts a lower life expectancy, charging a woman
more for that reason would wrongfully compound the prior injustice of the abuse itself.
As Hellman emphasizes, the “key element” in her account is that the actor must not
only aggravate the harms caused by a prior wrong, but also “interact with the injustice or
the effects of the injustice” in a way that makes the actor “implicate[d] in” it.58 This “mix-
ing element” is satisfied when, as I have just noted, the actor takes the prior wrong or its
effects as a reason for action. To mark the contrast, Hellman offers the example of an en-
trepreneur who opens a business down the street from a struggling competitor. If the com-
petitor’s difficulty is due to a recent robbery, then the entrepreneur’s market entry will
amplify the harm of that prior wrong. But the entrepreneur does not compound that
wrong, in Hellman’s sense, unless the entrepreneur takes the robbery or the competitor’s
resulting difficulties as a reason for opening the new business now.59
Hellman posits that a moral prohibition on compounding injustice justifies significant
strands of our body of anti-discrimination norms. First, she suggests that prohibitions on
indirect discrimination (or “disparate impact”) are justified in this way. Such norms im-
pose a heightened standard of justification for selection criteria that disproportionately
exclude members of particular groups. Thus, for example, an employer will need a good
reason for using a standardized test on which white people tend to score higher than Black
people. Such a demand for special justification, Hellman suggests, can be understood as
frowning upon actions that compound injustice. For if a Black person scores poorly
because of prior injustice that he or she has suffered (for instance, in being denied fair
educational opportunities), then an employer who held the test score against him or her
would be compounding that prior injustice. Of course, not all Black people who score poorly
will do so because of prior injustice. But the stronger the correlation is between a person’s
race and his or her test score, the likelier it is that any given Black person who is being
excluded by the test is also being subjected to the wrong of compounding injustice.60
57 Id. at 110.
58 Id. at 109, 112.
59 Id. at 112.
60 Importantly, and as Hellman acknowledges, “not all instances of indirect discrimination compound injustice” in
this way. Id. at 114–15. For example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized a claim of indirect sex discrimination based on minimum height requirements for prison guards.
Skepticism of that requirement makes sense from the point of view of intervening against patterned inequality,
but not as a way of avoiding compounding injustice in Hellman’s sense.
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Hellman offers a parallel account of the line of cases in the U.S. Supreme Court
that frown upon some sex-based generalizations but allow others.61 In the classic case
of Reed v. Reed, for example, the Court struck down a state law that preferred men over
women as administrators of estates. The generalization underlying the law may well have
been sound: It stands to reason that, in Idaho in 1970, men had more of the relevant
capabilities than women. But, as Frederick Schauer observes, “[i]f in 1970 men were on
average better trained and more experienced in business and finance than women, the
reason was surely that generations of women had been steered away from the world of
business and finance and in the direction of occupations thought to be more suitable for
their gender.”62
Hellman thus argues that disfavoring a woman based on her (presumed) lack of busi-
ness acumen would amount to compounding the prior injustice that she suffered in being
denied the opportunity to develop that acumen in the first place.63 Meanwhile, and in con-
trast to cases such as Reed, the Court has occasionally upheld sex-based distinctions that it
understands to be predicated on “real”—roughly meaning biological—differences, such as
the connection between sex and pregnancy. Hellman’s view yields a natural explanation
for that: If it were really true that the only causal mechanism of some difference between
males and females is biology, then it would follow that the mechanism must not be a prior
injustice suffered by anyone—and thus that there is no prior injustice for differential treat-
ment predicated on that difference to compound.64
Finally, Hellman has recently extended the same line of thought to machine learning.65
Suppose that some risk-assessment algorithm that informs lending or parole decisions
predicts more bad outcomes for Black people than for white people. That will be because,
as far as the data reflect, Black people more often possess characteristics that more often
coincide with these outcomes. But if a given person possesses those characteristics as a
result of having suffered an injustice—or if, as with the history of child abuse, the relevant
predictive characteristic just is being the victim of a particular injustice—then holding
those characteristics against the person amounts to compounding the prior injustice. Peo-
ple who are treated unfavorably on account of algorithmic predictions about them can
thus be morally wronged—even though the predictions are not impeachable on grounds
61 See Hellman, Sex, Causation, supra note 14.
62 SCHAUER, supra note 36, at 140.
63 Hellman, Sex, Causation, supra note 14, at 43.
64 Id. at 33, 46; see also supra note 60 (explaining that Hellman’s account does not extend to claims of indirect sex
discrimination based on height requirements).
65 See Hellman, supra note 8; Hellman, Big Data and Compounding Injustice, supra note 14.
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of accuracy—in light of the causal history that explains their possession of the relevant risk
factors.
III. IS THERE A DISTINCT WRONG OF COMPOUNDING INJUSTICE?
We now have two distinct ideas on the table: (1) the concern that certain allocative prac-
tices sustain or aggravate patterned inequality and (2) Hellman’s argument that the same
practices subject individuals to the wrong that she terms “compounding injustice.” The
ideas differ both in their temporal orientations and in the natures of the wrongs they iden-
tify. The argument from patterned inequality rests on the future consequences that, thanks
to present patterns, a present selection practice will have—consequences that may ripple
out to any number of other people injured by the pattern. In contrast, Hellman’s argument
identifies a personal wrong in disfavoring an individual, in the present, in light of how
others treated her in the past. Despite these differences, the arguments reflect a common
ambition to justify anti-discrimination norms on terms that apply even when a decision-
maker does all that one could do to ensure that likes (in respect of a predicted attribute)
are treated alike. I turn now to offer some grounds for doubt about Hellman’s strategy
for accomplishing that objective—and thus, indirectly, for centering the argument from
patterned inequality in our understanding of why anti-discrimination norms have force
even when there is no accuracy-based objection to be made.
A. The Role of Prioritarian Regard
In measuring these two accounts against one another, we should begin by identifying
and extracting yet a third moral concern that is not uniquely attached to either of the two,
but that figures importantly in Hellman’s examples. Specifically, in each of Hellman’s
cases, the central actor makes things worse for some people—and not for just anyone,
but for people who are already worse off than others through no fault of their own. Many
would agree that this alone is a bad feature of an action from a moral point of view.66
When our actions will affect other people, we should prefer choices that will not make
things even worse for those who are already less well-off than others—or, at least, we
should observe that preference if the existing disparity is not somehow deserved.67 For
concision, I will call this general moral concern prioritarian regard.
Hellman’s examples highlight the relevance of this concern to the morality of many
allocative decisions. Consider the life insurer that chooses to impose a higher premium on
victims of abuse. The burdened class here is defined by an undeserved injury, so choosing
66 See, e.g., Derek Parfit, Equality and Priority, 10 RATIO 202, 212–14 (1997).
67 This qualification makes for “desert-adjusted” or “desert-accommodating” prioritarianism. See, e.g., KASPER
LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, BORN FREE AND EQUAL? 168–70 (2013).
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to make the lots of those people even worse—for the benefit of others in the insurance
pool or (more likely) for the benefit of the insurer itself—is a problematic choice from
the point of view of prioritarian regard. And as Hellman’s analogy underscores, something
similar is happening in many paradigmatic cases of wrongful discrimination. One reason
that it strikes us as morally problematic for an employer to use a standardized test that
disproportionately excludes Black Americans, for instance, is that we know this decision
means making individual Black candidates who are already undeservedly disadvantaged
in myriad ways even worse off.
Nonetheless, the prioritarian regard to which I have just appealed is importantly dif-
ferent than Hellman’s conception of compounding injustice—and so should not be mis-
taken as supporting it. For one thing, prioritarian regard includes no corollary to
Hellman’s “mixing” element; its force does not depend on what an actor takes as a rea-
son for acting as he or she does. And even with respect to Hellman’s “amplifying” ele-
ment, prioritarian regard differs from Hellman’s more specific concern in at least two
ways. First, prioritarian regard is not sensitive (as Hellman’s view is) to whether some-
one has suffered a prior wrong as opposed to some other misfortune.68 And second,
prioritarian regard does not depend (as Hellman’s objection does) on whether the ad-
ditional burdens that an already-disadvantaged person might face would be causally due
to a prior disadvantage or not; rather, the force of the prioritarian concern just depends
on how badly off that person already is. In other words, the prioritarian concern is about
piling more burdens onto the same people, not pinning more effects to the same causal
chains.69
Prioritarian regard adds something significant to the argument based on patterned in-
equality that I outlined in Part I; it furnishes a moral argument for anti-discrimination
norms that is rooted in the interests of the particular individuals who are discriminated
against and rests on the undeserved character of their existing disadvantage. Still, a con-
cern of this kind can play only a modest, supporting role in justifying anti-discrimination
norms. For one thing, it lacks any clear connection to socially salient groups. (Thus, the
concern might apply with equal force to the use of criteria that correlate with educational
68 Hellman thus asks whether “the fact that injustice produced [certain] effects constrains how others interact with
these victims”—and, as explained above, answers yes. Hellman, Sex, Causation, supra note 14, at 509; see also
Hellman, Indirect Discrimination, supra note 14, at 110 (“Should the insurance company take into account the
fact that battered women are victims of wrongdoing when determining whether to include this relevant risk
factor?”).
69 Cf. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Algorithmic Discrimination and Compounding Injustice 14, 22 (n.d.) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (drawing a like distinction between Hellman’s proposed duty and an alternative
“duty not to cause additional harms to the unjustly worse off”).
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attainment or, for that matter, with any facet of the so-called lottery of birth.70) Moreover,
prioritarian regard itself can furnish no explanation of why the obligation to practice it
should take the particular form of avoiding practices that disproportionately exclude dis-
advantaged individuals from the opportunities that employers (or others) have to allocate.
For example, it could well be better, from a prioritarian point of view, for an employer to
spare the costs it incurs for the sake of avoiding disparate impact and spend the savings
on benefits for those who are truly worst off—people who generally will not have the
borderline qualifications needed to benefit from disparate-impact prohibitions in the
first place.71 So although prioritarian regard does add something to the moral case for
anti-discrimination norms—in that such norms presumably do make the world better
from a prioritarian point of view—I doubt that this concern can play a central role in their
justification.72
B. The Roles of Exploitation and Expression
If Hellman’s account of “compounding injustice” is to earn its keep—and, in particu-
lar, if it is to play a central role in the justification of anti-discrimination norms—it has to
identify a distinct wrong, going beyond the failure to afford due prioritarian regard, that
occurs when an agent takes the fact or effects of a prior wrong as a reason for subjecting its
victim to additional burdens. I will now argue that Hellman’s arguments and examples do
not warrant the conclusion that any wrong inheres in acts meeting that broad description.
It will help to begin with a related but narrower class of actions: those that exploit a
prior wrong or unjust social arrangement for the actor’s benefit. Patrick Shin’s defense of
rules prohibiting direct discrimination on the basis of race or sex—even when such discrim-
ination is statistically rational—nicely captures the intuition that such acts are immoral.73
As he puts it:
What is wrong with using an enumerated factor as a statistical proxy for some
employment-relevant deficiency (assuming a valid statistical relation does hold)
is that it exploits the very circumstances of injustice that justify the enumerated
70 Cf. FISHKIN, supra note 35, at 37, 49–50. In Reed, for instance, a concern of this kind could not explain why sex is
an unacceptable proxy for business acumen, but a high school degree—which will also separate the better-off from
the worse off—would be a permissible one. Similarly, an employment practice with a disparate impact in terms of
any axis of relative disadvantage—such as health or wealth—would be open to a comparable objection.
71 Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 13, at 140 (noting that “[r]ough compensatory justice would be better served if,” rather
than employing affirmative action policies, “we distributed lump-sum cash reparations to every member of the
disadvantaged group, or concentrated compensation on the least well-off within the group”).
72 Sophia Moreau voices similar doubts about prioritarianism as an account of anti-discrimination norms in
Moreau, supra note 55, at 183–84.
73 Shin, supra note 38, at 175–76.
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factor approach in the first place. A commitment to that approach . . . is based in
part on the empirical judgment that the enumerated factors pick out categories of
unacceptable inequality that exist or have existed in our society, such that we have
reason to regard the use of those classifications as especially pernicious to the ends of
justice. The use of an enumerated factor as a proxy for employment-relevant defi-
ciencies is problematic because its rationale depends on the existence of, and then
makes profitable use of, these same circumstances: it exploits correlations that arise
out of the very conditions of injustice that the enumerated factor approach is in-
tended to help eradicate.74
Supposing that we grant the intuitive force of Shin’s argument, the question is why the
employer’s making profitable use of a prior injustice is wrong. Once we factor out both
the effect of the employer’s conduct on the maintenance of patterned inequality and the
prioritarian regard discussed above, what is left in such an action for us to condemn?
I think the residual concern is that, in making use of unjust social conditions, one ex-
presses a kind of comfort with or acquiescence in them.75 In Hellman’s life-insurance sce-
nario, for example, the insurer seems somehow to treat a woman’s victimization as
tolerable by reducing it to just another actuarial variable. In reality, there is nothing inev-
itable about that inference about the insurer’s attitudes: One can condemn an act as
wrongful and also recognize its bearing on some question of independent relevance to
one’s decisions. Still, in the noisy register of what our actions are reasonably taken to ex-
press about our attitudes, a decisionmaker who accepts an unjust pattern as real and de-
cisionally relevant—and adapts her own behavior so as to maximize her own welfare in
light of it—might reasonably be heard to accept that injustice as, well, acceptable. This
inference about the actor’s attitudes will be especially reasonable against a backdrop of
justifiable suspicion, on the part of victims, that those with power do not take the relevant
wrong (such as domestic abuse) seriously.76 Moreover, the very fact that the action could
foreseeably be interpreted to convey an attitude of acquiescence or acceptance—and that
the actor did it anyway—might say something additional about the meaning of his or her
choice.77
74 Id.
75 Cf. id. (suggesting that “[i]f nothing else, one might say that the employer’s action in such a case violates a general
ethos” of the anti-discrimination project).
76 Cf. Adam Omar Hosein, Racial Profiling and a Reasonable Sense of Inferior Political Status, 26 J. POL. PHIL. e1, e8
(2018) (arguing that the state acts unjustly by causing “members of a political community to have a reasonable
sense of inferior political status,” and that “whether it would be reasonable for someone to have this sense depends
on the evidence available to her”).
77 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Eidelson, supra note 45, at 1619, 1622–23.
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This expressive understanding of the wrong in exploiting injustice is buttressed by the
fact that the wrong in such cases does not seem to depend on whether a person is actually
subjected to any additional increment of harm on account of any prior injustice she suf-
fered (as “compounding injustice” in Hellman’s sense requires). Suppose, for instance, that
a particular Black candidate for some opportunity has had the unusual good fortune to
suffer little meaningful racial injustice in her life; perhaps she is a wealthy and recent Af-
rican immigrant. Nonetheless, she is denied some benefit based on a generalization about
the relative aptitudes or qualifications of Black candidates—a relationship traceable to ex-
isting racial injustice. The decision that is made about this candidate does not amplify a
prior injustice that she suffered, but it seems to me to trigger the same unease that is at
work in Shin’s (and Hellman’s) scenarios. I take that to be because—at least in light of
present shared understandings about the meaning of actions that exploit injustice—the
decision manifests the same problematic attitude of acceptance toward the underlying ra-
cial pattern.78
But if the moral concern triggered by Shin’s and Hellman’s examples is a concern
about what a person expresses in making use of an injustice, that concern necessarily loses
its force when the actor is not making use of an injustice at all. This is not a problem for
Shin: His argument does not extend to the use of a “merit-based procedure” with disparate
impact, precisely because the “injustice-exploiting dimension” is then absent.79 For
Hellman’s argument about anti-discrimination norms, however, it is critical that the moral
concern she identifies not be similarly limited. After all, the account is offered precisely
to explain why “merit-based” selection processes do sometimes wrong those whom they
disfavor. And yet I suspect that the account draws its appeal from the discomfort with
exploitation that we have just identified and distinguished—perhaps joined with prioritar-
ian regard and, in the background, the concern about perpetuating patterned inequality—
and so does not reach many of the cases for which it is designed. In other words, when the
actor cannot be said to be using any injustice against anyone—because the decisional cri-
terion would be equally useful with or without the prior injustice—the expressive concern
that powers Hellman’s account fades away.
Suppose, for instance, that in Hellman’s early-release case, the state administers a per-
sonality test that gauges an individual’s propensity to commit violent crimes. And suppose
that a history of suffering child abuse increases a person’s likelihood of violence by means
of affecting one of the broad aspects of personality that the test measures—an aspect of
personality that would maintain its relevance even in a world without child abuse. Now
imagine both that a prisoner is denied early release because of his test results, and also that
78 As Brennan and Jaworski emphasize in another context, such meanings are often mutable. See Jason Brennan &
Peter Martin Jaworski, Markets Without Symbolic Limits, 125 ETHICS 1053 (2015).
79 Shin, supra note 38, at 176.
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his test results would have been different if he had not suffered child abuse. Even if one
is uneasy about the state’s use of “history of child abuse” itself as a decisional criterion—
because this uses the prior wrong or “mixes” the state’s agency with it—I do not think
there could be any like objection here. After all, the state cares only about crime-prone
personality; it is completely indifferent to child abuse. What it owes to the victim of
child abuse, I think, is precisely what it owes to others who are equally badly off, bear
equal responsibility for their circumstances, and pose equal risks to others.
Or take the example of the business that opens alongside a competitor struggling with
the aftermath of a robbery. If the new entrant is somehow seizing on the very fact of the
robbery, maybe its action is improperly exploiting another’s wrong. But suppose instead
that the new entrant has a standing practice of setting up shop whenever there is unmet
demand for its products in a given neighborhood. The company certainly could decide to
make an exception in order to allow the robbed business to recover and meet the same
demand instead. But it seems to me that would be essentially an act of charity—and almost
surely a misdirected one, given others’ far greater need for assistance of the same economic
value. It is not something to which the robbed business has a moral entitlement.
Hellman might reply that, although the actors in these last two scenarios are not
using the wrong against the victim, they are still using the effects of the wrong against
the victim.80 There is certainly a sense in which that is true, but I think it is not a sense
with moral force. As Hellman’s “mixing” imagery nicely conveys, the force of the “using”
charge comes from the sense that the actor is, although not committing the wrong, engaging
with it—that is, with the wrongful act—in a way that involves some positive orientation
toward it. That is what gives the action its potentially problematic meaning. But the actor
who simply applies merit-based criteria—criteria that some fail to satisfy because of past
wrongs they have suffered and others fail to satisfy for other reasons—does not thereby
orient his or her agency to the prior wrongs in any way. Even if he knows about them
(which he might or might not), they do not figure at all in the justifying reasons for his
action. And in such a case, it is difficult to see how his incorporating what are in fact
“effects of the injustice” in his decision—without incorporating them under any description
relating to the injustice—would “implicate[] him in the [prior] wrongdoing” or “make[] it
in part [his] own.”81 Put another way: Why is such a case any different than the ordinary
case (which Hellman would not count as wrongful) in which an actor knowingly aggra-
vates the harms to another of a prior injustice, but acts for reasons that are causally in-
dependent of that injustice?82 The prior injustice figures in the actor’s reasoning to no greater
degree in one kind of case than in the other—and yet, as Hellman’s “mixing” condition
80 Cf. Hellman, Indirect Discrimination, supra note 14, at 112–13.
81 Id.
82 Regarding Hellman’s treatment of such cases, see supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
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reflects, the actor’s reasoning is essential to the felt wrongness of the actions in her exam-
ples (at least once any lapse of prioritarian regard is factored out of them).83
Now, because I have interpreted the wrong in exploitation cases in expressive terms, I
have to acknowledge the possibility that there could be a problematic meaning expressed
in these other, nonexploitation cases as well. And because the relevant meanings are de-
termined in part by our shared beliefs and conventions—which bear on what we know to
expect others to make of our choices—it is rarely possible to offer an abstract argument
that a given action does not bear, to any extent, a problematic meaning. Nonetheless, any
suggestion that the actors in the hypothetical cases I have just described convey accep-
tance of or acquiescence in the upstream moral wrongs—the wrongs of child abuse
and robbery—seems to me to misapprehend our existing conventions. And although I
am less certain about whether such a convention would be a desirable one to erect (a
change that would make Hellman’s moral objection sound by a kind of bootstrapping),
I doubt that, too. A hypothetical shared understanding that those who employ merit-based
selection procedures thereby express a positive attitude toward upstream injustices might
have the benefit of inducing valuable departures from those means of selection. But, at
least at its onset, this novel understanding would still be both inaccurate and unfair.
The better meaning to read into the use of merit-based selection procedures would be
one that is actually true—and this returns us to the point about patterned inequality. As
we saw in Part I, there are urgent moral reasons to avoid perpetuating the racial pattern of
which any given Black candidate’s disadvantage is a part. These reasons justify departing
from narrowly merit-based selection criteria, or at least second-guessing the employer’s
choice of such criteria, as indirect discrimination norms demand. And the force of these
reasons, in turn, means that we often can take an employer’s use of merit-based decision
procedures, heedless of their disparate impact, as expressing something—not an attitude
toward past injustices, but a troubling willingness to sustain a society characterized by
patterned inequality and its devastating effects. Significantly, that problematic meaning
extends (like the objection from patterned inequality itself ) even to cases that do not involve
83 In her gracious reply to this article, Hellman adheres to her view that there is a wrong inherent in the class of
actions that her definition of compounding injustice picks out (even independent of what such actions might
express) and suggests that this “may be simply a point at which our [respective] intuitions lead in different
directions.” Deborah Hellman, Personal Responsibility in an Unjust World: A Reply to Eidelson, 1 AM. J.L. &
EQUALITY 282 (2021). I certainly join in her invitation for “the reader to mine her own intuitions on these points.”
Id. I would simply emphasize (which is not to say that Hellman would not) the importance of extending this
mining endeavor to “all our judgments, whatever their level of generality”—and thus of not only cataloging one’s
verdicts on various particular cases, but also probing the intrinsic plausibility of the principles and distinctions to
which one would need to appeal in order to ground the case-specific judgments that one is inclined to make. JOHN
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 29–30 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (describing the method of reflective
equilibrium).
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compounding injustice in Hellman’s sense: When employers in traditionally male fields
unnecessarily employ height requirements that disproportionately exclude women, for ex-
ample,84 they may both wrongfully contribute to patterned inequality and express a mor-
ally defective attitude toward those who will suffer from the continuing pattern, even
though they do not disfavor any woman on account of a prior wrong that she suffered.
But, in any event, the more fundamental point is that once we have accounted for all of these
expressive and non-expressive considerations, they seem to squeeze out any remaining sense
that making an adverse decision about someone based on a fact about him or her is wrong
simply because that fact is itself due to some prior wrong. And if that is right, we should not
seek to justify anti-discrimination norms on the basis of such causal connections.
IV. CONCLUSION: ALGORITHMS AND COMPOUNDING INJUSTICE
I began this article by emphasizing that the problems posed by algorithmic prediction do
not solely concern failures to identify some form of merit as accurately as possible, but also
concern the ways in which merit-tracking decisionmaking can itself be morally problem-
atic. My central aim has been to distinguish, elucidate, and evaluate two different expla-
nations of what those ways are—both of which, in fact, could intuitively be described as
concerns about “compounding injustice.” One points to the fact that purely merit-based
decisions will tend to perpetuate patterned inequality that grievously constrains some peo-
ple’s flourishing and makes a mockery of equality of opportunity. The other, championed
by Hellman, charges that the same merit-based decisions are moral wrongs because they
implicate the decisionmaker in the prior injustice to which many of the affected individ-
uals have been subject. I have suggested that Hellman’s analysis highlights the relevance of
prioritarian regard to allocative decisions, and that it might identify a problematic form of
exploitation in some cases, but that it does not convincingly account for anti-discrimination
norms that turn on the disparate impact of merit-based procedures.85
84 E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); see supra note 60.
85 This argument could leave untouched Hellman’s parallel account of direct sex discrimination (see supra notes 61–
63 and accompanying text), because such cases do involve the use of an unjust pattern. But in that context, too,
the cases and principles that Hellman analyzes might better be explained by the concerns that I emphasized in
Part I. As the Supreme Court once explained the constitutional rule: “Intentional discrimination on the basis of
gender by state actors violates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where, as here, the discrimination serves to
ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women.
. . . [We] acknowledge[] that a shred of truth may be contained in some stereotypes, but require[] that state actors
look beyond the surface before making judgments about people that are likely to stigmatize as well as to perpetuate
historical patterns of discrimination.” J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (emphasis added). So
understood, the norm’s logic is forward-looking and systemic; it does not turn on the value of avoiding
“compounding” an injustice that a present victim of discrimination may have suffered in the past.
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That upshot, in turn, means that the backward-looking, complicity-based account also
cannot capture the serious moral issues posed by the allocative use of algorithmic predic-
tions. If an objection such as Hellman’s is compelling only when a decisionmaker uses a
criterion whose value rests on prior injustice, then such an objection will have little to say
about a large share of the predictive relationships that algorithms are apt to uncover and
employ. Many of those relationships—such as between criminal history and recidivism, or
employment history and job performance—would surely emerge even without any up-
stream injustice in how the predictors themselves are distributed. Nonetheless, allocative
decisions that are based solely on such predictions will certainly contribute to sustaining
patterned inequality. And thus my broader conclusion: To understand and confront the
threats that algorithmic selection processes pose, just as to understand anti-discrimination
norms more generally, we have to attend to the effects that certain decision procedures
have on the larger social pattern of resources, opportunities, and status—not the causal
history by which any particular person came to occupy his or her place in the pattern.
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